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Cutting down the Cypress leylandii, pittosporums, and cotoneasters on your neighbours’ land – the 
resolution of spite hedges. 
 
Lynden Griggs & Rouhshi Low* 
 
 
Abstract: Queensland, New South Wales, and the United Kingdom have enacted legislation that governs 
what are colloquially known as spite hedges. These are barriers, commonly horticultural, that once 
constructed, block the view or sunlight from a neighbouring property. The matter was also recently raised 
in the Tasmanian Parliament. This article examines whether legislation should be enacted to deal with this 
issue, and if so, what is the regulatory model that need be adopted. The conclusion is that a layered nuanced 
response is needed to balance the interests and obligations of neighbouring landowners.  
 
“He said that the lower owner cannot obstruct the natural flow of surface water unless he can and 
does so in a manner which will not injure the upper land. On the contrary the law is, I think, that he 
may block it by any works on his own land, so far as they reasonably necessary to protect his land 
for his reasonable use and enjoyment; but that in doing so he must not recklessly of his neighbour so 
as to cause wanton damage to him. That, in my opinion, accords with the broad principles of the law 
of nuisance today, except perhaps in relation to what have been called ‘spite fences’. The law does, 
it seems, permit a man to block his neighbour’s view from mere malice and not for the better 
enjoyment of his own land.”1 
 
“A shared geography underlies an intractable interconnectedness and dependence…These 
[neighbourly] bonds of co-operation are diminished when neighbours feel that they don’t accept or 
understand each other. People act on the basis of reciprocity. A sense that one has not been treated 




                                                 
* Respectively, Academics: University of Tasmania, Queensland University of Technology. 
1 Gartner v Kidman, (1962) 108 CLR 12, 46. 
2 Renee Gastaldon, Dividing Fences and Dangerous or Intrusive Trees: The Draft Neighbourhood Disputes Resolution Bill 2010 
(Qld), Queensland Parliamentary Library, e-research Brief 2010/25, p1, quoting from Mirko Bagaric, “Everybody needs good 
neighbours’, Courier Mail, 3 October 2007, p 32. 
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Introduction 
The issue of spite hedges or spite fences and its impact on neighbourly relations, dramatically contrasted in 
the above quotes, was recently the subject of attention of the Tasmanian Parliament.3 This concern of the 
Tasmanian Legislative Council mirrored recent legislative developments in New South Wales,4 
Queensland,5 and the United Kingdom.6 Indeed a community action group7 exists to seek reform of this 
area, arguing for some of regulatory control of hedges that block sunlight or views. In effect, legislatures 
and community groups are railing against the conservative common law principles of primacy given to the 
monopolistic landowner who argues that they can do as they please on their own land. This common law 
ideal endorsing a philosophical underpinning that landowners can perseverate that ‘my house is my castle’.8 
In effect, spite hedges are, as the phrase suggests, barriers built or planted (such as the planting of the trees 
mentioned in the title) on or near the boundary that block the view or sunlight from a neighbouring 
property. The trees or structure may, though not always, be planted, constructed, or maintained out of 
malice, though in the United States, from where the phrase appears to originate, common law intervention 
can only occur where there is malice on the part of one landowner. A genuine, reasonable, and legitimate 
purpose for the hedge amounting to a persuasive defence in this jurisdiction.  
The purpose of this article, against a background of growth in the solar panel industry in Australia,9 the 
underlying economic value of a view as well as its aesthetic qualities for the landowner, and the increasing 
density within our suburbs, is to ask what is the appropriate framework, if any, that is suitable for the 
resolution of these disputes. Is it a case that good fences make good neighbours and the despotic dominion 
that one landowner has in respect of their own land entitles that person to prevail over a broader, but more 
nebulous model of societal obligation that should flow from land ownership. Is this broader public interest 
served by strictly enforcing the crystalline certainty10 of control over one’s land above, below, and laterally 
in the 3D image presented by the land ownership? What are the contrasting approaches currently adopted, 
and which would serve the nation as a whole? The emotion underlying these types of disputes cannot be 
underestimated. In 2000, a dispute over a Cypress Leylandii11 was seen as the reason for the murder of one 
of the landowners on which the hedge was constructed.12 Tragically, a similar ending occurred some three 
                                                 
3 “Problem Trees and Hedges”, Legislative Council Hansard, May 15, 2012, 1-22. 
4 Trees (Disputes between Neighbours) Amendment Act 2010 (NSW). 
5 Neighbourhood Disputes Resolution Act 2011 (Qld). 
6 Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 (UK). 
7 <problemhedgesaustralia.com>, last accessed June 28 2012. 
8 The phrase deriving from the work of Sir Edward Coke, The Institutes of the Laws of England, (1628). 
9 Solar accounted for 0.1% of total electricity generation in Australia in 2009-10 but has grown by 21% a year on average over the past 
five years. From 2001-2009, 86,000 solar panel systems were installed with a combined capacity of 123 megawatts. In 2010 there 
were over 158,000 solar panel installations with a combined capacity of 305 megawatts. Indeed the strongest growth in renewable 
energy production in 2009-2010 occurred in solar-powered electricity generation. See Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 
Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics, ‘Energy in Australia 2012’, February 2012, p49. 
10 See Carol Rose, “Crystals and Mud in Property Law”, (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 577. 
11 The Cypress Leylandii is an evergreen tree popular in the United Kingdom that can grow to a height of 15 metres in 16 years. 
12 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1347205/Gardener-is-shot-dead-in-hedge-feud.html, last accessed June 28 2012. 
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years later with the perpetrator later committing suicide in gaol.13 One United Kingdom owner has also 
endured a 24-year legal battle to have a hedge trimmed.14 
 
Common law resolution 
Despite an intuitive feel that disputes of this nature would be relatively common, and the publicity 
surrounding this issue extensive,15 in Australia very little case law has examined the matter. One suspects 
that the cost of litigation would rarely support the economic advantages that may flow from a neighbour 
succeeding in challenging the status quo, and if relations between adjoining landowners become so intense 
and contraire, the remedial option of selling would become more attractive.16 However, in an analogous 
situation in the Western Australian Court of Appeal in Evans v Miller17 a landowner sought to enforce a 
restrictive covenant that restricted the height of buildings on the neighbour’s property. The neighbour’s 
retaining wall, above ground spa, and surrounding fences were above the height restriction, with the 
neighbour arguing that as the applicant had purchased with knowledge of the structures in place, they were 
seeking to gain an advantage they never had. The court granted a mandatory injunction requiring the 
lowering of the structures. The restrictive covenant was to be enforced. 
By contrast, to the dearth of common law authority in Australia, the matter has been extensively examined 
in the United States of America. With due respect and acknowledgement towards the state based resolution 
of these issues in this nation and the recognition of individual nuances between states, the law can be 
summarised that a United States citizen is entitled to construct a building on her or his own land to obstruct 
or deprive the adjoining landowner of light, air, or a view.18 However, a landowner cannot maliciously 
erect a structure with the purpose of depriving the view of the neighbour, particularly where no useful 
purpose is served by the structure.19 Legislative intervention has also followed, reflecting this common law 
development, which sees a statutory prohibition against the erection or maintenance of spite fences if done 
so with malice and intent to injure or annoy an adjoining landowner.20 The courts have liberally interpreted 
provisions such as this, so that plants that would not be considered horticulturally as a hedge plant can still 
be under the prism of common law interpretation of the legislation.21 Today, in the United States, “the spite 
                                                 
13 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1310011/Hedge-wars---evergreen-battles-make-good-neighbours-turn-
nasty.html?ito=feeds-newsxml, last accessed June 28 2012. 
14 Ibid. 
15 For example in Queensland, the topic was one that the daily media would routinely address. See the discussion of this in the 
Gastaldon paper, above n 2. 
16 As Justice Young opined in 1994, ‘Fortunately, this type of activity [the construction of spite hedges] has not, to date, been rife in 
Australia, though occasionally, one gets close to this sort of area.’ (referring to Hilderbrandt v Stephen [1964] NSWR 740 where a 
restrictive covenant on land prevented any building being constructed. A land owner constructed a fence around a tennis court, the 
court ruling that this was not a building within the meaning of the covenant. The Honourable Mr Justice Peter Young, “Some 
Thoughts on Fences,” (1994) APLJ Lexis 8, 12 of online version.  
17 [2011] WASCA 89; BC201101876.  
18 1 Am Jur 2d Adjoining Landowners §102. 
19 1 Am Jur 2d Adjoining Landowners §108. See authority such as Burris v Creech 220 N.C. 302 (1941); Burke v Smith 37 NW 838 
(1888); Kirkwood v Finegan 55 NSW 457 (1893); Haugen v Kottas 307 Mont. 301 (2001). 
20 1 Am Jur 2d Adjoining Landowners §109. 
21 Dowdell v Bloomquist 847 A.2d 827 (2004), where the plant in question a row of arborvitae trees. 
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fence doctrine is a well-established nuisance law rule…Modern courts generally hold that a spite fence is a 
nuisance, for which the offended neighbor can obtain injunctive relief and damages.”22 
In the absence of such developments in Australia, and the author’s view is that the matter is too pressing to 
wait for the minimalist, incremental, glacial like approach of judicial evolution, the argument will be made 
that legislative or regulatory intervention is necessary. Indeed the incapacity of the common law to respond 
effectively was noted with some prescience 15 years ago by the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission where, in its report on neighbours,23 noted that “In the United States, there is some movement 
towards courts recognising that blocking sunlight to a solar collector may be a nuisance, but it seems 
unlikely that Australian courts will follow this lead.”24 
“The common law does not reflect the evolving importance to society of access to sunlight and 
views. The common law of nuisance is of very little use to a neighbour trying to prevent a tree from 
causing damage. This means that a minor dispute that could be resolved by the inexpensive removal 
of a small tree is likely to become a major dispute in which property damage has occurred and will 
continue to occur unless huge amounts are spent to remove what has become a very large tree.”25 
 
Neighbour Law26 – our starting point for analysis 
Our beginning starts with each individual lot of land. Each folio of the register or certificate of title or 
ownership based on deeds is a representation in some way of a discrete parcel. Unlike the doctrine of 
fragmentation of proprietary rights with physical reality a mere illusion, the parcel of land can be seen, 
held, traversed, and covered. It is “not an abstraction.”27 As previously noted, is the fundamental foundation 
of land law the monopolistic, exclusive, and dominant control of land ownership, an idea that permeates 
with no commitment, or notion of community to the adjoining owners. This idea suggests that subject to 
statutory and regulatory controls through planning schemes and local council imperatives, each person is 
entitled to do, plant, construct, as they like. The impact on the neighbour irrelevant and meaningless. Each 
landowner a stranger vis-à-vis their neighbour.28 While this “traditional liberal model may well be a 
caricature of ownership …that does not make it less influential.”29 This form based around elements of the 
right of exclusion, permission needed for access, compensation paid where property is seised without 
compensation, and agreement based limitations reflected by the law of private servitudes.30 It is a policy 
that says that the community is favoured by a individual, inward looking protection of rights. It disavows or 
weakens any notion of obligation. 
                                                 
22 James Charles Smith, “Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Law of Neighbours, (2012) 39 GA. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 757, 772. 
23 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Neighbour and Neighbour Relations, Report 88, 1998.  
24 Above n 23, [2.10].  
25 Above n 23, [2.21].  
26 It can be noted that Australia does not have a discrete body of neighbour law, unlike, for example, South Africa and Scotland. See 
Smith, above n 22, 759. 
27 Smith, above n 22, 758. 
28 Smith, above n 22, 761 describes this as the stranger model of resolution. 
29 Helena R. Howe “Copyright limitations and the stewardship model of property”, (2011) 2 I.P.Q. 183, 186. 
30 See the discussion in Helena R. Howe “Copyright limitations and the stewardship model of property”, (2011) 2 I.P.Q. 183, 188-189. 
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By contrast, should the reality brought about by interdependence through physical proximity, yield, as the 
neighbour principle in tort law did, to an understanding that each landowner has a sense of mutual 
expectation, trust, and obligation towards their neighbour – a friend model underlying community spirit.31 
Are we, as Kevin Gray persuasively argues, to adopt a model whereby “ownership of land is comprised of 
limited rights of use and exclusion, which are circumscribed by community-orientated responsibilities,”32 a 
philosophy that appears reflected in the recent legislative changes governing spite hedges on the eastern 
seaboard of Australia. 
 
Solutions from Elsewhere 
Putting aside this divide between society and the individual, the public and the private, the libertarian and 
the communitarian Baker33 suggests, in seeking to have these disputes resolved primarily between the 
neighbours themselves, that a legally recognised pre-statement guideline should be promulgated in some 
way. This would give primacy to the use that first existed, with this supplemented by an examination of 
which use required something to occur, or not to occur on neighbouring land, for the use to take place 
successfully.34 So for example, where solar panels are put in place by a landowner with them blocked by a 
pre-existing tree, the tree would have priority, being in situ earlier in time. However, where the solar panels 
are installed before a competing structure, and require something not to occur on the neighbouring land 
(such as the planting of a species of tree that would shade the panels); the solar panels prevail. The basis of 
this is not only that they were first in time, but the first in time will, if well-established, trump that 
something has to occur on the adjoining land (i.e. that the shading trees would not be planted).35 
By distinction to this approach, which relies somewhat on the goodwill of neighbours, Fennell36 turns to the 
economic market and seeks a demand/supply driven solution. She suggests that a trading platform for land 
use options be created. The example presented by the author37 to illustrate this involves one landowner 
planting a row of young sequoia trees many years ago. Neighbours have moved in and installed solar 
panels. After a period of some years, the sequoias now shade the solar panels. The parties seek to bargain, 
but one or both parties may be inflexible and refuse to compromise, and any attempt to resolve through 
litigation is expensive, unwieldy, and involves high costs. The answer proposed is for the local city to 
purchase the options to control the right to have a solar easement and negotiate with its residents. As 
Fennell comments in the context of the contemporary role of land as part of our discourse of the law: 
                                                 
31 Smith, above n 22, 762. 
32 Helena R. Howe “Copyright limitations and the stewardship model of property”, (2011) 2 I.P.Q. 183, 203, referring to K Gray and S 
Gray, Elements of Land Law, 2009, pp 111-114; K Gray, “Equitable Property”, (1994) 47(2) Current Legal Problems,  157, 189. 
33 R. Lisle Baker, “My Tree versus Your Solar Collector or your Well versus My Septic System? – Exploring Responses to Beneficial 
but Conflicting Neighboring Uses of Land”, ( 2010) 37 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1. 
34 Baker, above n 33, 35. 
35 Baker, above n 33, 37-38. 
36 Lee Anne Fennell, “Property and Precaution”, (2011) 4 J. Tort L. 1 
37 Fennell, above n 36, 23. 
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“It does no good to insist that property maintain a pristine standardised form on the outside if it will 
be gutted from within. If we wish to keep property alive as a distinctive concept, it must be able to 
respond more sensitively and flexibly to competing, spatially sensitive demands. That means looking 
behind the ‘keep off’ signs to recognize and price the incursions into flexibility that underlie the 
message.” 
Relying less on the economic intervention through the market, and more on public hand of government 
Kapnoullas suggests, specifically in the context of solar power, that for Australia, legislation is required to 
clarify and allow for the creation of solar easements.38  In noting that the purchasers have a “justifiable fear 
of lost investment”, given a payback time of between 4 and twenty years,39 she considers that legislation be 
enacted to allow solar access easements based on a mathematical formula, (such as in California where 
legislation restricts shading on a collector area to no more than 10% between the hours of 9am to 3pm), and 
that these solar easements be enforceable in law level administrative tribunals. 
 
The Response to Date 
 
United Kingdom 
The UK response to this problem lies in Part 8 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. Emanating from a 
consultation paper delivered in 1999, which saw in excess of 3,000 responses. A majority of some 85% 
argued in favour of a law regulating high hedges.40 
The legislation states: 
65. Complaint to which this Part applies 
 (1) This part applies to a complaint which –  
(a) is made for the purposes of this Part by  an owner or occupier of a domestic property; 
and 
(b) alleges that his reasonable enjoyment of that property is being adversely affected by 
the height of a high hedge situated on land owned or occupied by another person. 
 
High hedge is defined (s66) to “mean so much of a barrier to light or access as –  
(a) is formed wholly or predominantly by a line of two or more evergreens; and 
                                                 
38 Anna Kapnoullas, ‘The Ideal Model for Solar Access Rights’ (2011) 29 EPLJ 416. 
39 Ibid, 417, 417 
40 As noted in Nicola Padfield, “The Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003: the ultimate nanny-state Act?”, (2004) Criminal Law Review 
712. 
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(b) rises to a height of more than two metres above ground level. 
The legislation then provides for a process whereby a complaint can be made to a local authority (s68) with 
that authority able to issue remedial notices, though any such notice cannot require the hedge to be clipped 
to a height lower than two metres. (s69). The remedial notice operates as a local land charge and binds any 
person who is an owner or occupier of the land. The legislation provides for an appeals mechanism (ss71-
73), and for enforcement powers (ss75-78).  
 
New South Wales 
The New South Wales legislation commenced in August of 2010 and amended the Trees (Disputes between 
Neighbours) Act 2006. Part 2A applies to a group of two or more trees that are planted to form a hedge and 
which rise to a height of at least 2.5 metres (s14A). Section 14B provides: 
“An owner of land may apply to the Court for an order to remedy, restrain or prevent a severe 
obstruction of: 
(a) sunlight to a window of a dwelling situated on the land, or  
(b) any view from a dwelling situated on the land,  
if the obstruction occurs as a consequence of trees to which this Part applies being situated on 
adjoining land.” 
 
A person seeking an order under this legislation must give the adjoining landowner 21 days of the lodging 
of the application (s14C), with the jurisdiction of the Land and Environment Court allowing them to make 
orders requiring specified action to remedy the obstruction of sunlight or a view, or indeed to remove the 
trees and to replace with a different species (s14D). Costs can also be recovered (s14D(h)). Before making 
the order the Court must be satisfied that the applicant has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement 
(s14E). In its jurisdiction to make an order the Court is to consider a wide array of matters including the 
location of the trees; whether the trees existed prior to the dwelling the subject of the application; whether 
the trees grew to a height of greater than 2.5 metres during the period the applicant has owned the land; 
whether the trees have any historical, cultural, social, or scientific value; the contribution the trees make to 
the local biodiversity; the intrinsic value of the trees to public amenity; the amount of sunlight lost as a 
result of the obstruction; whether the trees are deciduous;  the nature of the view and extent of any view 
affected by the obstruction; and any other such matter the court considers relevant (s14F). A council or 
Heritage Council is entitled to be heard under these proceedings (s14G). Successors in title are bound by 
the orders (s 16). Interestingly, the relevant Minister is to determine whether the policy objectives of the 
Part remain valid, with such review to occur as soon as possible after 2 years from commencement (s 14I).  
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Queensland Legislation 
The Queensland Neighbourhood Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Qld) commenced on 1 November 2011, 
replacing the Dividing Fences Act 1953 (Qld). Relevant to this paper is Chapter 3 of the Act which deals 
with trees.41 It places responsibility on the ‘tree keeper’42 to ensure that their neighbour’s43 land is not 
affected by a tree growing on the tree-keeper’s land (ss 41 and 52). Under s 46, land is affected by a tree if 
any of the following applies: 
 branches from the tree overhang the land; 
 the tree has caused, is causing, or is likely within the next 12 months to cause— 
 serious injury to a person on the land; or 
 serious damage to the land or any property on the land; or 
 substantial, ongoing and unreasonable  interference with the neighbour’s use and enjoyment 
of the land. 
Whilst there is no specific mention of the blocking out of sunlight in s 46, it was recognised in the 
explanatory notes that there can be obligations as to views and light that might be demonstrated to interfere 
with the use and occupation of the land.44 The explanatory notes further provide that45:  
‘[E]xamples of what might constitute unreasonable interference may include blocking of sunlight 
to solar panelling, blocking of light which causes mould growth in the home, or interruption to 
satellite reception’  
Where a neighbour’s land is affected by a tree, the tree-keeper and neighbour are encouraged to resolve the 
matter informally (s 60). If this is not possible, the neighbour may exercise the common law right of 
abatement or apply to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) for resolution of the issue 
(s 60). Section 61 gives QCAT the jurisdiction to hear and decide any matter in relation to a tree in which it 
is alleged that land is affected by the tree. The neighbour must give the tree-keeper a copy of the 
application 21 days before the day that the application is to be heard by QCAT (s 63). The orders that 
QCAT may make are provided for in s 66, including an order to remedy, restrain or prevent substantial, 
ongoing and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the neighbour’s land:  s 66(2)(b)(ii). 
Where the interference is an obstruction of sunlight, s 66(2)(b)(ii) only applies if the tree rises at least 2.5m 
above the ground and the obstruction is a severe obstruction of sunlight to a window46 or roof of a dwelling 
                                                 
41 The word ‘tree’ is given a wide definition under the Act: see s 45. 
42 A ‘tree-keeper’ is limited to holders of the property interests specified in s 48, such as the registered owner of the land on which the 
tree is situated and the lessee of the land on which the tree is situated: s 48. 
43 A ‘neighbour’ includes persons such as the registered owner of the land affected by the tree or an occupier of the land: s49. 
44 Explanatory Notes, Neighbourhood Dispute Resolution Bill 2010 (Qld) p28. 
45 Explanatory Notes, Neighbourhood Dispute Resolution Bill 2010 (Qld) p32. 
46 ‘Window’ is defined as including a glass door, window forming part of a door, skylight or other similar thing: s 66(6). There is no 
explanation of what ‘severe obstruction’ means, either in the Act or in the explanatory notes. 
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on the neighbour’s land: s 66(3).47 Matters that QCAT may consider when making its order include steps 
taken by the tree-keeper or the neighbour to prevent or minimise interference and for interference that is an 
obstruction of sunlight, any contribution the tree makes to the protection or revegetation of a waterway or 
foreshore (s 75). The Act also requires QCAT to be satisfied of certain mattes before it can make an order 
under s 66, such as the neighbour having made a reasonable effort to reach an agreement with the tree-
keeper and the neighbour having taken all reasonable steps to resolve the issue under local laws (s 65).  
 
Victoria 
Victoria has opted for a non-legislative model to resolve disputes between neighbours, with the procedure 
offered not restricted to high hedges, nor did it evolve specifically to address this problem. Disputes Centre 
Victoria48 provides a no-cost mediation service to assist neighbours warring over trees, views, sunlight, as 
well as other matters. The following case example is taken from their website49: 
 
Maria called the Dispute Settlement Centre of Victoria (DSCV) after her neighbour added an extension to 
¾ of the dividing fence. She said the extension, which increased the height of the fence by 60cm blocked 
light for her garden and hindered her view of the street. 
Maria's husband Rick agreed with what they were doing because he thought the neighbours were going to 
put up a trellis with roses. 
The assessment officer organised a mediation date at a venue not far from Todd, Liz, Rick and Maria’s 
street. The mediation went for over three hours.  
When it came time to talk about the fence, Todd was reluctant to pull down the extension, which he had 
just installed at great expense. Rick offered to reimburse him for the materials and help install a trellis as 
originally proposed. In the end, Todd agreed to take down the extension and give the material to Rick to 




                                                 
47 The Act makes clear that despite s 178 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), QCAT may make an order under s 66 that is intended to 
result in the access of light to land: s 66(4). Section 178 provides: From and after 1 March 1907, no right to the access or use of light 
or air to or for any building shall be deemed to exist, or to be capable of coming into existence, merely because of the enjoyment of 
such access or use for any period or of any presumption of lost grant based upon such enjoyment. 
48 <disputes.vic.gov.au> last accessed June 28 2012. 
49 http://www.disputes.vic.gov.au/case-study-fence-dispute, last accessed June 28 2012. 
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What Model to Adopt  
There is no doubt that at its core, property ownership gives the right of access and a right to exclude. Its 
starting point is the owner of land has the capacity to exercise unfettered discretion as to what they can and 
cannot do on that land. However, we know that modern land ownership is rather more constrained. All tiers 
of government impose restrictions. As Fennell notes, a quote worth repeating in full: 
“Property, alone among entitlement types, delivers a hefty dose of personal control over a chunk of 
space for potentially unlimited span of time. Its accompanying veto power makes ownership 
incomparably valuable and uniquely hazardous. While this power makes possible a wide range of 
projects and endeavours, it also makes the rest of the world vulnerable to the ways in which that 
power may be deployed. Often the resulting collisions between power and vulnerability are efficient, 
but sometimes the power that property conveys is superfluous, of little or no value to owners, but 
highly threatening to the potential projects of nonowners…. 
Keeping the models limited and the doors locked will indeed keep property legible and distinctive, 
but it may also consign it to irrelevance as the realm of governance grows ever larger and the role of 
exclusion shrinks.”50 
 
Spite hedges are one such example of collision between power and vulnerability. The capacity of the 
landowner to plant a species of tree that can block the sunlight or view of the adjoining landowner without 
seeking to gain an advantage, (apart from privacy) is, in many jurisdictions, unfettered. But why would a 
person do this? Three reasons could plausibly be presented.51 First, the landowner planting the hedge may 
do so for privacy or for some reason that is justifiable to her/him. In essence, there is a reason for so doing 
– whether that reason increases the value of the land is irrelevant. Second, the landowner may plant the 
hedge to spite or act maliciously, or for some objectively unjustifiable reason towards the neighbour. 
Perhaps there is a tangential dispute and the relationship between the neighbours has become sclerotic. 
Third, as noted by Stern, the landowner planting the hedge may do so to take advantage of the monopoly 
that he/she enjoys over their land, and to extract a payment from the neighbour as consideration to remove, 
or not plant the hedge.52 The latter reason is, in the view of Stern, the only logical justification for 
legislation that would prohibit spite hedges.53 All other bases have no economic justification, but the 
economic analysis here fails to take account, as the author notes,54 of the ethics of building something to 
inflict pain. The first economic basis recognises a value to the landowner of building the hedge that 
outweighs the cost. The second – “so long as the fence builder receives great pleasure from inflicting pain 
on his neighbour, even a fence built out of spite is not inefficient – unless for some reason this type of 
                                                 
50 Fennell, above n 36, 62. 
51 As noted by Stewart E. Sterk, “Neighbours in American Land Law”, (1987) 87 Colum L. Rev. 55, 83-84. 
52 Sterk, above n 51, 84. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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pleasure ‘doesn’t count’ – an ethical decision, not an economic one.”55 The third basis is similarly unlikely 
to be adopted on objective economic grounds. The mere threat of construction is likely to extract the 
payment, as the neighbour will be aware that no remedy is available to prevent construction. So if 
economics is not the answer, then we must look to equity. Is there a problem for which intervention is 
justified, and if so, how do we intervene? 
The suggestion the authors make is that intervention is necessary. Without some dispute resolution 
mechanism in play, the amenity that one enjoys in their locale is seriously undermined. We argue that the 
values the community attaches to amenity, the emotional and economic worth of an aesthetically pleasing 
view and the economic and social significance of renewable energy make it imperative that a dispute 
resolution mechanism be enacted. The mantra of economics must yield to equity. Fairness of outcome and 
intergenerational benefits across successors in title is what we seek to achieve. But how do we achieve this? 
What might be equitable when we have to distribute the costs of preventing a monopolistic landowner from 
utilising the land in the way that he/she sees fit? 
Our starting point, with arguably our views not deviating from underlying economics, is that the person that 
receives the benefit should bear the cost of something that intrinsically will benefit them individually; 
though one could suggest that the benefits of spite hedge legislation will benefit the community more 
widely (ie. greater use of solar panels for the generation of electricity will lead to a reduction in carbon 
outputs). The second point is that if the community does benefit, the landowner who now sees the usage of 
their land restricted should receive something in return.  
Our solution, and working from the basis provided by Gunningham and Sinclair,56 identifies five criteria to 
guide any remedy. First, any solution must be efficient in terms of cost-effectiveness. The benefit must 
outweigh the costs. Second, the solution must allow the parties to transact to resolve the matter – this being 
the lowest cost solution to any dispute between the bilateral monopoly that is neighbourly relations. Third, 
the parties that benefit; the community at large, and the respective individual landowner, must bear the 
costs. Fourth, the policy response must be layered, responsive, and adaptive so that policy instruments that 
fail can be modified to succeed. Fifth, the response must be phased, and able to move responsively to the 
necessary tier that will succeed. As noted by Gunningham and Sinclair, “A further benefit of a phased 
approach is that by sequencing the introduction of policy instruments, we can enjoy the benefits of 
regulatory pluralism without degenerating into a smorgasbord approach, or worse, counterproductive 
instrument clashes. Thus one can begin with less interventionist instruments, and positive incentives, 
recognising that volunteers may respond more sympathetically than conscripts.”57 
The authors believe that  the first step in this phased response is the enactment of legislation in all 
jurisdictions along the lines of NSW and Qld to provide a statutory framework for remedial response that 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, “Policy Instrument Choice and Diffuse Source Pollution”, (2005) 17(1) Journal of 
Environmental Law 51. 
57 Ibid, 76. 
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can be used urgently. Second, governments need to appropriately fund dispute resolution centres of the type 
established in Victoria to assist neighbours resolve these matters. While beyond the scope of this article to 
examine the economics of such centres, the belief of the authors is that any such quantitative analysis 
would yield a conclusion that centres of this nature provide a superior outcome to relying on the more 
expensive, less time sensitive option of formal legal action. This phase could also include appropriate 
education and dissemination of information to encourage greater public awareness about the values of solar 
access rights and access to sunlight and the community interest in protecting this. Third, local authorities 
must explore the option of a trading market in solar easements or views that can achieve generational 
change over a long period to resolve this issue.  
Finally, planning schemes need to be urgently updated to take account of the increasing importance of solar 
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Our suggested staged response is represented in the table below.  
Response Aim Examples 
Phase 1: Legislation Provide a statutory framework for 
remedial response such as mandating size, 
placing responsibility on tree owners to 
maintain trees, requirements for informal 
dispute resolution and penalties for failure 
to comply. 
Neighbourhood Disputes 
Resolution Act 2011 (Qld) 
Trees (Disputes between 
Neighbours) Act 2006 (NSW) 
 
Phase 2: Encourage 
voluntary self-help 
Encourage residents to resolve 
neighbourhood disputes informally via 
mediation centres and education as to the 
value of sunlight and solar access. 
Dispute Resolution Centre 
Victoria 
Phase 3: Trading 
platform for land use 
options  
Establish a trading platform where local 
governments purchase land use options 
such as solar easements and bargain with 
its residents.  
 
Solar easements could be 
accessible via a permits system, 
with local councils given the 
authority to manage and 
administer this system. 
Permits can define proposed 
easements in terms of dimension 
and angle. 
Easements that are created can be 
registered on the title of both 
properties.* 
Phase 4:  Update 
planning legislation 
Recognise increase urban density and 
importance of renewable energy such as 
solar. 
 
Solar access boards or local 
councils invested with the 
authority via legislation to 
regulate solar access.*  
 
*These suggestions were obtained from A Kapnoullas, ‘The Ideal Model for Solar Access Rights’ (2011) 
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Conclusion  
Australia's estimated resident population reached 22.62 million at 30 June 2011, increasing by 320,800 
people since 30 June 2010. This is an annual growth rate of 1.4%, with inner-city areas, outer suburbs, 
urban infill areas and coastal areas experiencing higher population growth than other areas.58 Greater 
urbanisation and housing density will inevitably lead to an increase in interaction between neighbours on a 
variety of issues, such as trees, fencing, noise, and street parking.59 More importantly, because neighbours 
can be friendly or hostile, distant or close, relationships between neighbours will never be static or 
predictable. 60 Given the current inadequacies of the common law in relation to neighbourly disputes, state 
governments can no longer afford to be oblivious to this issue and must act to provide a suitable statutory 
framework governing neighbourly relations. Legislation should be enacted to clarify neighbourly 
responsibilities, particularly on pressing issues such as trees and fences, with the aim of encouraging 
neighbours to resolve these disputes informally. But instead of stopping there, State governments should 
look ahead to the use of solar energy and solar access rights, because this issue will become increasingly 
important in the future.61 How solar access rights can be managed will need to be addressed. The authors 
agree with the views put forward by some academics that current planning legislation needs to be updated 
to regulate solar access rights including creating a platform whereby such rights can be traded. In terms of 
spite hedges and neighbourly relations, Queensland and New South Wales have progressed in the right 
direction. The authors hope to see similar movements in the other States and Territories in Australia. 
 
 
                                                 
58 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Regional Population Growth 2010-2011, 30 March 2012 (cat no. 3218.0). 
59 Robert C Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes  Harvard University Press: Cambridge London, 1991), 
271. 
60 Explanatory Notes, Neighbourhood Disputes Resolution Bill 2010, p1. 
61 The Australian Government’s Clean Energy Future plan, which was passed in 2011, is an indication of the growing role clean 
energy technologies will play in Australia’s future. The Australian Government is targeted at investing over $13 billion in clean 
energy projects: Australian Government, ‘An Overview of the Clean Energy Legislative Package’ 
<http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/clean-energy-future/an-overview-of-the-clean-energy-legislative-package/> accessed 1 August 
2012. This includes the establishment of the Australian Renewable Energy Agency for the purposes of improving the competitiveness 
of renewable energy technologies and increasing the supply of renewable energy in Australia: Australian Government, Department of 
Energy Resources and Tourism, ‘Australian Renewable Energy Agency,’< 
http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/clean/arena/Pages/arena.aspx> accessed 1 August 2012.  
